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Abstract 
In this paper, an attempt is made to enhance understanding of  interfirm transactional 
relationships. The assumption is made that the development of an interfirm transactional 
relationship can only be understood thoroughly by studying the various aspects of such a 
relationship in mutual dependency. Three realms will be introduced, namely the 
contractual, the relational and the operational realm. These realms are assumed to be 
closely interconnected and the connections are assumed to be of a dynamic nature. In 
order to substantiate this multidimensional viewpoint, a case study will be presented and 
analyzed using a natural experiment methodology. 
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Introduction 
The area of interfirm relationships has received much attention from several scholars in 
different scientific disciplines. Early discussions particularly focused on the governance 
of interfirm relationships from an economic perspective. Institutional arrangements in the 
form of contracts were viewed as the dominant means to govern party’s behavior. Such 
arrangements are formal means to make mutual interests clear and to provide legal 
grounds to maximize commitment from all parties involved (e.g. Williamson 1985, 1996, 
1999).  
 
Of course, such a contractual perspective has its limitations.  It easily downplays the 
social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) of a transactional relationship. Furthermore, it 
ignores the operational aspects of a relationship. In recent years, the control of interfirm 
transactional relationships has gained attention in the management control and accounting 
discipline, following calls from Otley (1994) and Hopwood (1996).  Van der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman (2004), although predominantly taking an economic perspective, 
emphasize the social embeddedness of the control in transactional relationships by 
explicitly analyzing a trust-based control pattern (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
2000). Dekker (2003 a and b) integrates an economics perspective with a perspective 
from organizational theory, thus also emphasizing the relationship between control and 
trust. The evolutionary nature of an interfirm transactional relationship is emphasized by 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2004). They view interfirm relationships 
essentially as processes of rational interaction, in which transactions are coordinated and 
in which commitment and trust are built over time. This evolution is flanked by 
institutional arrangements (contracts) that serve to align interests between parties and to 
create conditions for trust building. 
 
It seems to go without saying that an interfirm relationship requires coordination at the 
operational level. There have to be created interfaces between the workflows of the 
individual organizations. Such coordination could require a high level of attention or a 
lower level depending on the way in which the interfirm relationship is formed and 
designed in contracts and informal agreements. 
 
This paper aims to explore a three-dimensional perspective on the evolution of interfirm 
transactional relationships. We propose that the soundness of interfirm relationships can 
be better described and understood if these relationships are studied from a contractual, a 
relational and an operational dimension or realm as a function of time. We propose that 
the contractual, the relational and the operational realm do not work independently, but 
are linked at certain moments.  
 
In the following sections we will present a discussion of these three realms in support of 
our propositions culminating in a basic framework. We will use this framework in an 
actual case situation in the energy sector to illustrate and refine our views, and to explore 
future areas of research. In the case situation a number of ‘events’ will be highlighted that 
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triggered chains of cause and effect. In the context of this paper, we define dynamics as 
the responsiveness of a cooperation to adjust to exogenous shocks. We argue that the 
urge for adjustment may originate in each individual realm, i.e. certain events happen in 
one realm, sometimes bubbling up to a different realm. By describing these cause and 
effect chains dynamic links between the three realms will be assessed. In addition, the 
mechanisms through which the dynamic links act will be traced. We will study an 
alliance that started with a common objective for the partners. During the course of its 
development the robustness of the partnership in the face of threatening events was 
determined by the trust of the individual firms in the alliance being able to still reach its 
initial objective. 
 
At this point we wish to emphasize that we use “a” transactional relationship as the basic 
entity in our discussion, whereas in reality organizations are confronted with multiple 
transactional relationships at the same time. At this stage of our research we will not 
address the multi-transactional implications, but recognize that these must be taken into 
account at a later stage in our research.  
 
1 A descriptive model of interfirm transactional relationships 
Basically, we submit that control in interfirm transactional relationships takes place in 
three realms in the relationship: the contractual realm, the relational realm and the 
operational realm. In the contractual realm contracts are concluded and adjusted. Once 
they have been concluded they form a legitimate power base for exercising control in the 
relationship. Furthermore, contracts point to the economic and strategic rationale of 
interfirm transactional relationships. In the relational realm control is relational of nature 
and takes the form of trust building. In emerging processes of rational interaction trust is 
built as a consequence of signaling trustworthy behavior. In the operational realm 
processes and transactions are identified, planned and coordinated. In the operational 
realm the actual processes or working methods, are depicted. It is very likely that, if two 
or more parties decide to work together, the original processes within the individual 
companies will need to be evaluated for revision. In the following section we will 
elaborate on each of these realms. In particular, we will argue that, although each realm is 
very much related to a different disciplinary body of knowledge, much interrelation 
exists. 
  
1.1 The contractual realm 
To analyze the contractual relationship component, transaction cost economics (=TCE) 
offers a rich set of constructs and provides explanations for formal as well as informal 
contracts (Williamson 1985, 1996, 1999, 2000, Speklé 2000 a and b). According to TCE 
contracts are institutional arrangements containing solutions to potential problems of co-
ordination and of opportunism. Rational actors are assumed to make purposive choices 
on the design of a governance or control structure. Because their rationality is ‘less then 
perfect’ (Lindenberg 2000) contracts will always be incomplete; it is impossible to design 
a perfect governance structure or control structure. Nevertheless, according to TCE these 
incomplete contracts will be efficient in the sense that they minimize transaction costs 
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(the costs of governing the relationship). Indeed, the transaction cost economics approach 
essentially is a theory of optimization. Although transaction costs are to a great extent 
considered to be unobservable, the theory still is founded on the idea that transaction 
costs are minimized and that therefore, the resulting (implicit) contract can be considered 
efficient.  
 
Of course, a minimization always presupposes conditions under which the minimization 
takes place. For instance, suppose the objective is to find the most efficient terms of 
governance of an interfirm transactional relationship with respect to oil transport. For that 
objective, it is of great importance to know whether the institutional environment of the 
interfirm transactional relationship (for instance legislation concerning the environment) 
can be considered static. If so, it is perhaps possible to design an efficient contract for all 
parties involved. On the other hand, if the period of optimization is long, environmental 
legislation may be considered to be variable and, perhaps, may be even part of the terms 
of the contract, leading to other contractual arrangements. Therefore, although the 
restrictions within which an optimal contract is set are not included in the optimization 
they are of great influence on the resulting contractual arrangement.  
 
Furthermore, being a theory of optimization, TCE theory will lead to a static theoretical 
understanding and at most to comparative evaluation. The processes that lead from one 
optimization to another cannot be understood on the basis of TCE alone. Simply put, 
TCE can provide a global understanding of the choice of the governance structure in 
specific transactions, but not of the change processes in governance and control. In 
general, the New-Institutional Economics, in which TCE spawned, shows static 
characteristics. The Old-Institutional economics is more dynamic and evolutionary of 
nature and incorporates the formation of the relational and institutional surroundings as 
corner stones in its analyses (Duindam and Verstegen 2000, Scapens 1994, Granlund, 
2001) 
 
Dynamics in the contractual realm can occur in a number of ways. Firstly, as has been 
presented in the example of oil transport, outside factors may generate a change in the 
conditions within which the contract operates. In this case, exogenous factors are at work. 
For instance, connecting a national electricity grid to foreign grids may increase the 
stability of future power delivery, which in turn, decreases cost of backup facilities 
having an impact on the terms of power delivery contracts. Secondly, the outcome of a 
minimization within the TCE may influence the bounds within which a next 
minimization will take place. A transaction between two parties, for instance an 
outsourcer and an energy provider, may result in an increase of information about each 
other. The outsourcer may have improved his estimation skills on potential power failures 
on account of the energy provider. This can easily result in a change of the contract 
conditions both parties have been operating with, and consequently, in a change of the 
contract itself. It goes without saying, that such a contractual development will limit the 
chances of a successful entry of a different contractor who is deprived of such knowledge 
and may be forced to take large risks in order to be competitive with the original 
contractor. Thirdly, it is possible that the outcome of a transaction will exert an influence 
on outside factors, which in its turn, as some sort of feedback, will influence the terms of 
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a new contract. A transaction between two parties may result in an increase of 
information about each other of such a nature, that trust between the parties is built 
(Tomkins 2001). For instance, when an outsourcer and an energy supplier discover 
similarities in organizational culture, or in the way in which they manage risk, this may 
increase mutual trust. Nooteboom, Chiles and McMackin (Nooteboom 1999, 2000 a and 
b, Chiles and McMackin 1996), amongst others, argue that the existence of trust may 
economize on the information needed for monitoring a transactional relationship and that 
less formal contractual safeguards are required. In this case, the information that the 
parties have about each other can be seen as a dynamic link in transaction cost 
economics, operating through trust as an outside factor, which functions as a catalyst. As 
a consequence, if we were to ignore concepts that are not to be understood within the 
TCE then we would miss perhaps important dynamic links between transactions.  
 
 
1.2 The relational realm 
In the relational realm parties continue to align their commitments to the relationship. 
Commitment regards the value a partner attaches to the relationship. For various reasons, 
in the course of the relationship the value a certain party attaches to the relationship may 
more and more come to deviate from the value the other party attaches to the relationship. 
This divergence of commitments coincides with differences in the degree to which parties 
are driven by the search for short-term self- interests. For instance, if a party attaches 
high (economic) value to a golden opportunity that emerges outside the relationship, in 
order to be able to also take this golden opportunity he could be inclined to not 
performing to the best of his competences in the ongoing relationship, thus behaving 
opportunistically in the short term. Such behavior signals a decline of commitment to the 
relationship. 
 
The relational realm is linked to the contractual realm. Once the reasonable fears for 
foreseeable opportunism are compensated for in contractual arrangements, i.e. interests 
are aligned by contractual arrangements, in the course of the relationship we submit that 
due to incompleteness of contracts, parties will feel the need to show their continuing 
commitment to the relationship. As long as they value the relationship they would want 
to continue it and, therefore, they would want to continue to invest in the relationship.  
But, of course, in order to avoid waste of investments, each party would like to make sure 
that the other party also continues valuing the relationship. Therefore, in the course of the 
relationship parties take an interest in showing each other that they keep the intention to 
act cooperatively, i.e. that they stay committed to the relationship. In this way, ‘goodwill 
trust’ between the parties is built, ‘goodwill trust’ being the expectation that the other 
party will continue to behave cooperatively (Lindenberg 2000) and, consequently, will 
not act opportunistically.  
 
Parties could show their commitments to each other by giving relational signals. 
Important opportunities for such relational signals arise from exogenous shocks. For 
instance, if a contractor in an outsourcing relationship is confronted with unexpected 
benefits, he might signal that he is prepared to share these benefits with the outsourcer. 
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Or when the contractor makes unexpected mistakes, he might signal these mistakes and 
their economic consequences to the outsourcer, thus showing his commitment to the 
relationship. Yet another example, if a golden opportunity emerges to the outsourcer 
outside the relationship, he might signal to the other party that he is willing to not take 
this opportunity but to perform to the best of his competences in the relationship.     
 
Relational signaling not only has inside effects, but could also have outside effects. Firms 
that enter a transactional relationship with other firms also interact with a number of other 
firms, thus being part of an organizational network. Such a network is rather social of 
nature and enhances reputation effects, as the members of the network are well informed 
about the members’ past and present behavior and whether it is in accordance with the 
norms of co-operation and social customs defined in the network. This makes the 
identification of potential suitable partners easier, and thus works as a selection 
mechanism (Chaserant 2003). Viewed in this way the organizational networks are viewed 
as a source of ‘goodwill trust’ in a cognitive sense, i.e. as a source of the expectation that 
a party will (continue to) behave cooperatively.  
 
The relational realm is also linked up with the operational level of interfirm relationships. 
By coordinating activities, parties are able to show their competences for the work at 
hand as well as their intentions to act cooperatively. Therefore, coordinating activities is 
closely connected to processes of building trust, competence trust as well as goodwill 
trust.  
 
 
1.3 The operational realm  
In this section we will discuss the operational realm of an interfirm transactional 
relationship. In this realm all explicit agreements from the contractual realm and the 
implicit expectations and commitments from the relational realm have to be realized in 
some way. The operational realm encompasses all development, planning, coordination, 
execution and monitoring activities needed to construct and sustain the actual workflows 
that produce the desired products or services in an interfirm relationship.  
 
The responsiveness and the way in which operational processes will develop in time 
depend on various factors. In the context of this paper we will make a distinction in 
factors which limit and factors that may enhance dynamics in the sense of flexibility in 
response to exogenous shocks. 
 
Factors limiting operational dynamics 
If two or more organizations decide to co-operate, this may have certain consequences on 
the existing operational structure of the workflows in each individual organization. The 
degree to which workflows and processes need to be restructured depends largely on the 
agreement the individual organizations have in the contractual realm and, perhaps more 
implicitly, on the expectations raised in the relational realm. We will denote the impact of 
cooperation in the operational realm as the level of redesign that is required to make the 
cooperation operational, as compared with the situation without any cooperation. To 
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describe changes in the operational realm we will use of business process modeling 
(=BPM) terminology (v. d. Aalst , Davenport 1990).   
Typically, in BPM operations are modeled as a series of interconnected activities. The 
transfer of work between activities requires some communication and possibly some 
coordination and control between the activities. In short, some sort of interface must be 
established between activities. 
According to Dietz (2006) an interface is an agreement in which products are provided to 
a client activity in one direction. All required cooperation between two activities requires 
at least four communication signals. To put it simply, in case two or more organizations 
decide to cooperate, then it is very likely that at the operational level the logic in which 
several different activities need to be bridged, at least some decisions must be made, not 
only on the general structure of the workflow, but also, which organization will be 
responsible for what activities. Depending on how the activities will be allocated to actual 
organizational units, this decision process will vary in the degree of formal attention and 
arbitration required between the parties involved. Also, in many situations, transfer of 
work may happen several times for one job between cooperating organizations requiring 
some synchronization to coordinate the workflow. The complexity and hence the effort 
required establishing a, for all parties acceptable, workflow structure very much depends 
on at least the following factors: 
1. the number and type of cross-organizational interfaces required; 
2. the number of work-transfer interfaces requiring synchronization and the 
transferability of work; 
3. the number and the novelty of the activities that are required to realize the contracted 
services. 
 
Situations with a large number of “handing over work” interfaces requiring extensive 
inter-organizational synchronization can be categorized as relatively difficult to change 
(figure 1), creating some sort of “operational” lock-in (Williamson 1985, 1996, 1999). 
Interfaces must be identified and agreed upon. Existing workflows must be altered to 
accommodate these new interfaces. All of this may require changes in responsibility and 
may create a need for training of personnel and the development or modification of 
information systems. Sometimes, these changes constitute a considerable investment. In 
addition, if little goodwill trust exists between the co-operating organizations, it is likely 
that for many interfaces explicit and formal monitoring facilities will be installed (see 
Tomkins [44]), further adding to the cost of co-operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. the number of inter-organizational interfaces is symbolized by the arrows, representing 
workflow directions. 
 
A workflow, i.e. a series of interconnected activities, may cross the formal boundary of 
organizations more than once, introducing the need for cross-organizational 
synchronization (see figure 2). It goes without saying that the complexity of controlling 
Org. A Org. B. 
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such a workflow operationally increases dramatically compared with a single work 
transfer operation as shown in figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  A schema symbolizing a workflow across two organizations requiring substantial inter-
organizational synchronization. 
 
In case the cooperation of organizations entails new activities for which little experience 
is available, the uncertainty of the way in which new workflows can be developed 
increases. A certain risk is introduced when investments must be made to develop 
“subject-matter” knowledge and knowledge to construct effective and efficient 
workflows in order to satisfy the contractual requirements. 
 
Improving operational dynamics 
Arguably, improving flexibility and reducing the risk of failure, the negative effects 
presented in the previous section must be reduced. Because the operational realm 
implements the objectives originating from the contractual realm, much of the 
complexities in the operational realm will be already introduced in the contractual realm. 
If, for instance, a contractor is approached to operate as a functional specialist, it is not 
unlikely that this contractor will have to link with several different existing workflows. In 
that situation synchronization issues need to be addressed. In general, managerial 
foresight with respect to the consequences in the operational realm will be beneficial. 
In particular, in novel co-operations, in which little experience can be drawn from 
previous strategic co-operations, uncertainty in the operational realm may be increased. 
In such situations trust, in particular goodwill trust, originating from the reputation of the 
individual partners may compensate for the risks identified here. Basically, goodwill trust 
is a vital ingredient for innovation in co-operations. After all, for any experience there 
was a first time. 
 
 
1.4 Dynamic links between the contractual, relational and operational realms 
Following the previous discussion, we conjecture that neither realm in its own right can 
comprise a long-term relationship. Instead, the three realms are interconnected. Events 
may occur in either realm and bubble through to an adjacent realm. Influences across the 
boundaries of the realms operate via links, represented as arrows A1 to C2 in figure 3.  
 
 
Org. A Org. B. 
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Figure 3 The three-realms model 
 
 
Much of the current literature concentrates on the contractual and the relational realm and 
up to some extent, to both. Our descriptive model also includes the third, the operational, 
realm, which potentionally provides a larger scope to explain the dynamics of an 
interfirm relationship. An example may illustrate this claim. We may point to the 
observed short-lividness of many joint ventures (Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 
forthcoming). By nature, joint ventures exist in relative isolation from their founding 
organizations. Basically, they operate relatively independent, have their own management 
responsibilities and can develop their own internal workflows in relative independence. 
Initially, a joint venture may operate successfully. Risks identified in the contractual 
realm are well contained and made explicit by the investments made by the founders. 
Also, the operational realm is simplified because much complexity in the workflows can 
be constrained within the legal boundaries of the joint venture organization. The number 
of cross-organizational workflow interfaces is diminished. On the long term, however, 
 
institutional environment 
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this co operative structure may be severely challenged because any competence based 
trust in the relational realm is accumulated within the joint venture and cannot be easily 
transferred to the founding organizations. The founding organizations are increasingly 
lagging behind in any positive development such as trust building, in the relational realm. 
In the end, the relational realm may loose its vitality when challenged by certain 
threatening events. 
 
Although, joint ventures may fail due to a wide spectrum of reasons, our framework 
provides an interesting option to explain certain developments in any type of interfirm 
transactional relationship. To explore the qualities of our framework further, an actual 
case situation will be introduced in the following section. The developments or events 
which occurred over time in this case together with our framework will be used to 
explain the actions that followed. 
  
 
2 The Case study 
2.1 Introduction 
An interfirm transactional relationship in the Dutch utility sector, that has been going on 
between two organizations for several years now, was selected as case study object. The 
purpose of this case study is to gain insight into the existence and nature of the links (A1 
to C2 in figure 3) between the three realms of interfirm transactional relationships. 
 
Section 2.2 will contain the setup of our research. Section 2.3 will describe the energy 
market and the institutional background for the emergence of the alliance. In sections 2.4, 
2.5 and 2.6 the parties involved in the specific case as well as the initial objective for the 
alliance will be discussed. After that, in the sections 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9, the three realms will 
be described as they came forward in the case. Section 2.10 will go into the events we 
traced and cause and effect chains. Section 2.11 will discuss the results, after which we 
will draw some conclusions in section 2.12. 
 
2.2  Set up 
Figure 3 shows all possible connections between the three realms. As it was set out in the 
introduction we will investigate which links were recognized in a real case situation and 
we will try to trace the mechanisms through which these links act. Which methodology 
should we choose? If figure 3 represented a physical framework consisting of three items 
connected by links that were the object of research, we could try experiments. In the 
experiments we could try to manipulate one of the three items in controlled 
circumstances, for instance by hitting it, and look for the effects on the other items. If we 
were to choose the hits in such a way that all the possible links could be observed if 
existent, for instance hitting every item at least once and waiting for the effects of 
previous hits to disappear before hitting an item again, we could after the experiment 
draw conclusions on the presence and nature of the links. For instance, whether some 
links work one-way and other links two-ways, whether some links are missing, whether 
the intensity of the hitting matters, perhaps whether chains of cause and effect can be 
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observed and so on. By definition the links that would be observed would be dynamic 
links as there would necessarily be a passage of time as the effects materialize.  
 
Of course figure 3 does not represent a physical framework and obviously it was 
impossible to experiment with a real-life alliance. However, in the case research a 
parallel line of reasoning was followed, trying to trace events that influence the realms 
and look for the effects. More in particular events were sought that were unconnected to 
previous developments in the alliance, that were exogenous as far as the case is 
concerned. Furthermore, a combination of events was looked for that influenced every 
realm at least once and that had a potential for triggering all six links involved. Following 
every event the cause and effect chains that appeared were monitored and the dynamic 
link was described. In this way the presence or absence of the links could be assessed and 
the nature of the links present could be determined. By definition this study can only 
generate a description of a development path and dynamic links as the effects of an event 
will take time to materialize. In that way the case description could be used as a means 
for developing the framework further. Therefore, we can call this an exploratory case 
study using a natural experiment methodology. On the one hand it was attempts to follow 
the set up of an experiment, trying to discern events in a controlled way and trying to 
monitor cause and effect chains. On the other hand, it only can generate a quasi certainty, 
as there was no control of experimental conditions. However, when studying an alliance 
there can only be attempts to get as close to an experiment as possible. All the 
shortcomings of a quasi experiment are present of course. 
 
Llewelyn (2003) discerns five levels of theorizing in which case research can play a part, 
generating five levels of theory: Metaphor theories, Differentiation theories, Concepts 
theories, Theorizing settings and Grand theories (Llewelyn 2003, p. 687). In terms of 
Llewelyn (2003) our case will function as a means for gradually deriving a concept 
theory “explicating practice” and creating “meaning and significance”(Llewelyn 2003, p. 
674) Our case could generate an improved understanding of the meaning of the three 
realms through linking them to each other, in the setting of a specific case.. 
 
Several in depth interviews were conducted with persons from both companies, who 
were, and still are actively involved in this relationship. The interviews helped to 
reconstruct the events that have shaped the relationship from its early beginning, in 2001, 
up to the present day. The interviews were semi-structured as described by Yin (1994). 
The case research consists of interviews conducted with the persons maintaining the 
transactional relationship and their hierarchical managers. Every interview was recorded 
and transcribed and forwarded to the interviewee for comments and approval. New 
subjects or developments within transactional relationships were acquired by asking open 
questions about differences between the previous situation and the current situation, 
having the interviewee expand on their perception of important events and to elaborate on 
the positive and negative effects. In a follow-up round the persons originally interviewed 
is asked: whether the events recorded involved only one realm initially, whether the 
interpretations of the research team with respect of the nature of the links between the 
three realms per event were accurate and whether confidence in the initial alliance 
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objective was the source of the robustness of the alliance when the unexpected events 
occurred. 
In addition to the interviews the contract and the service level agreements were studied. 
 
2.3 Institutional environment 
In 1996 the European Union signed an act on the liberalization of energy markets. This 
directive (1996) states:  
 
“The Directive establishes common rules for the production, transmission and 
distribution of electricity. It lays down the rules relating to the Organization and 
functioning of the electricity sector, access to the market, the criteria and procedures 
applicable to calls for tender and the granting of authorizations, and the operation of 
systems. The internal market in electricity will initially be subject to a gradual market 
opening so that the electricity sector can adapt to its new environment. Member States 
may impose upon undertakings operating in the electricity sector public service 
obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality 
and price of supplies, and to environmental protection.” 
 
Most likely, this directive represents a motivation for organizations using or supplying 
substantial amounts of energy to invest in strategic transactional relationships, the 
foundation of national energy markets (Amsterdam Power Exchange, APX, the UK 
Power Exchange, UKPX, Nordic Power Exchange, Nord Pool) and the European energy 
market (the European Energy Exchange, EEX). It was expected that new power 
generation technologies such as solar energy, cogeneration heat plants (CHP’s) and wind 
energy would lead to more efficient and environment friendly energy production. A shift 
in the investment climate was expected to occur in which environment friendly 
production is clearly favored. In 1996 the Dutch government started to implement the 
European directive, which is now known as the new Dutch electricity law. From 1999 
until 2004 the electricity markets were gradually opened, starting with the category of 
high-energy consumers (mostly firms in the chemical and heavy industry sector) and 
ending with the low-energy consumers (i.e. the category of individual households). 
Another fundamental change was the abandonment of a national, central energy 
provisioning policy in favor of a more decentralized model in which private initiatives 
are encouraged. This liberalization of the energy market urges the traditional energy 
boards to actively compete with newcomers on the energy market.  
 
In figures 4 and 5 the situation before and after the implementation of the new Dutch 
electricity law has been visualized. In the period before the new law was introduced, 
large energy consumers had to provide the central regulation authorities with energy 
demand forecasts. These forecasts were then used to setup and tune the large power 
plants and to buy electricity from other (institutional) energy boards for the purpose of 
guaranteeing delivery. In this system, energy consumers benefit from overestimating their 
demand, because overestimation was generally accepted, whilst underestimation was 
penalized. This resulted in a general overcapacity of power plants owned and financed by 
the government. From a technical point of few, new small-scale power generation options 
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provided only a limited alternative to the standard centralized provisioning regime. E.g., 
large energy consumers could utilize so called co-generation power plants to provide for 
their own needs. However, since this type of technology produces electricity and heated 
steam, a demand for both products in fixed relative volumes would be needed to make 
this option economically feasible. Possibilities for energy trading, in order to sell excess 
capacity, were virtually non-existent. The net result of this regime was that the 
application of alternative energy generation on a local scale was effectively limited to a 
few of the largest energy consumers with a steady energy demand. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Electricity production & distribution chain before 1996 
 
 
 
Figure 5  Electricity production & distribution chain after 1996  
 
In the period after the introduction of the new electricity law, the situation changed 
drastically. A national regulator controls the national grid and local transformer stations. 
All other governmental power regulation and generation bodies have been privatized. 
Now, energy consumers can buy energy on an open market. Energy provisioning 
contracts may vary in length and may involve other services. This new freedom of choice 
makes energy cost a manageable commodity for energy consumers and new market 
challenges are presented to energy provisioning companies. However, this freedom 
comes at a price. To control this new commodity a thorough understanding of energy 
consumption patterns, energy generation options and energy prices on the market on the 
short, middle and long term are needed to optimize costs. Many energy consumers lack 
this knowledge whilst energy providers don’t have this understanding from a consumers’ 
perspective either, but are eager to learn. Energy consumers are beginning to realize that 
they may not be able to justify the development of sufficient expertise on their own. 
Although almost any company is extremely dependent on reliable energy provisioning, it 
is not considered to be a part of the core business in many companies and outsourcing is 
nowadays high on the management agenda. 
 
Given the novelty of this market and the relative inexperience of most participants, this 
market represents a unique opportunity to research strategic interfirm relationships from 
the stage of infancy to full maturity  
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2.4 The parties involved 
Organization P 
Organization P is a hospital treating 20.000 patients a year and 250.000 patients on a 
policlinic basis. The hospital has around 600 beds and a floor space of 95.000 square 
meters. P employs about 30 specialties and 2700 employees, of which 115 are medical 
specialists. Altogether P has 42 functional groups divided in three main categories: the 
medical group, the medical-sustaining group and general sustaining group. The medical 
and medical-sustaining groups have separate supervisors, who constitute the management 
team. The management team is based on equivalence and is the link between the board of 
directors and the general sustaining group. This functional group contains functions such 
as administration, human resources, purchase, PR and hotel & technical department and 
is hierarchically organized. The spokesman (energy coordinator) of the hotel & technical 
department and his hierarchical manager of Technical Services (TS) were interviewed.  
 
Organization Q 
Organization Q can be characterized as a contractor, which was originally a subsidiary of 
a public energy board. Q is now a relatively independent business unit, specializing in 
total utility asset management, covering maintenance, assets and commodity costs 
services, founded in November 2001. A particular area of specialization is the operation, 
maintenance and modification of secondary utilities such as heat (steam or hot water), 
cold (cold water, air cooling) electricity and water treatment. Basically, Q offers two 
types of contracts; a unit rate pricing and performance related pricing scheme. The parent 
company of Q has 9.638 employees and generated an EBIT-profit of 536 million euros 
and revenue of 5 billion euros in 2003. The spokesman (exploitation manager 
outsourcing) of the contractor and his hierarchical manager were interviewed. 
2.5 The initial objective  
The urge for organization P to co-operate with an organization Q specialized in energy 
provisioning and related services, is rooted in three strategic considerations. Organization 
P decided to invest in two cogeneration heat plants (CHP) to provide the hospital with 
heat and electricity (1995). The total capacity of these installations is 5,6 MWe (Mega 
Watt electric power). The electric capacity of the cogeneration installations (two) is twice 
as much as the hospital would require, creating an opportunity to sell excess energy on 
the energy market. However, due to a gradual price drop in electric energy in 
combination with a steady price increase of natural gas, this scenario proved to be 
unprofitable. The management of P believed that a suitable partnership could alleviate the 
problem by increasing the scale of operation. Another motive for organization P to seek 
cooperation was that the two maintenance engineers running and maintaining the 
cogeneration installations were approaching retirement age. Recruitment of two new 
engineers would be difficult, because of the limited career opportunities within 
organization P for persons with this type of specialization and the high demand for this 
type of technical specialization on the market. Finally, the management of organization P 
concluded that energy generation and marketing it is not their core business. Although a 
hospital is very dependent on a reliable energy supply, this doesn’t necessarily mean that 
energy provisioning is an in-house activity. 
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The initial transaction objective concerned the supply and maintenance of the 
cogeneration plants, the boiler room, the absorption cooling and the back up power 
supply. Organization P had some specific requirements concerning a transactional 
relationship. Firstly and most importantly, organization P wished to minimize any 
operational involvement with the services mentioned, i.e. the utilities were regarded as 
black boxes from P’s perspective. Organization P was predominantly interested in 
maximizing the trade-off between availability of the utilities against running cost. 
Secondly, organization P wished to delegate the aforementioned services preferably to a 
single partner to reduce management involvement with communication and arbitration. 
The partner was allowed to subcontract other parties, but would be entirely responsible 
for their actions at all times. Other perceived conditions for cooperation were: 
• The partner was free to choose the technology needed to provide the services, and 
therefore should be technologically competent and expected to make sound 
managerial decisions concerning investment and operation policies. 
• The partner was required to have a good reputation in the utility services market, and 
preferably should have some experience with the utility requirements of hospitals. 
• The partner should be ready to provide the required services by the end of 2001 
• Since electrical power is critical in a hospital environment, special guarantees were 
required concerning uninterrupted power supply, in particular during workdays. 
2.6 Partner selection 
Organization P wrote a tender outlining their interests in a long-term partnership and sent 
it to several energy boards and other energy service suppliers. This tender contained 
general information about requirements and desires of organization P. Five offers were 
received, one of which was sent from organization Q. All five were invited to give a 
presentation at organization P. Based on this presentation and the credentials of each 
potential partner, the selection was narrowed to just two offerings. Organization P hired 
an outside consultant knowledgeable in the utility sector to assist in the final decision 
making process.  
 
One of the two organizations selected had to withdraw because of a disagreement with a 
large company it cooperated with in a merger, which delayed the selection process for 
about half a year. After this period, a second invitation was sent to all organizations 
again, giving them the chance to update their offer. Organization Q, operating with a 
subcontractor, was finally selected, because their offer was the cheapest. A letter of intent 
was signed between organizations P and Q, which practically cut off all contacts with the 
other four bidding companies and paved the way for operationalizing the relationship. 
Organization Q was given clearance to access detailed historical information on the 
utilities organization P was using. A project team was established, consisting of an 
energy technician, a project manager, an exploitation manager and an account manager, 
all from organization Q Their task was to identify in detail the potential of their 
cooperation, and each member was assigned to examine particular aspects of the 
contractual relationship, for instance the amount of energy needed during peaks and lows 
in energy demand and the future requirements and needed capacities. The additional 
information gathered by operating the utilities under due diligence was discounted in the 
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final offer. This process took seven months. Finally, the contract was signed by both 
parties at the end of 2001.  
 
During the initial stages of the relationship between P and Q, much of the development 
took place on the contractual and relational level. The operational level was beginning to 
function not before the period of due diligence.  
2.7 Contractual realm 
Basically, the formal contract contained the following agreements: 
• Organization Q was responsible for the provisioning of energy (defined as a service 
level agreement). 
• Organization Q would buy two CHP’s and corresponding technical installations, 
formerly owned by organization P, which were to be used for providing the energy 
(electricity, steam, heat, natural gas and cooling). 
• Organization Q would provide all kinds of services (maintenance, upgrading the 
CHP’s) and ideas to improve energy efficiency. 
• Organization P would compensate organization Q for energy supply and the use of 
other services via an indexed pricing scheme. For every type of service, a separate 
pricing scheme was agreed upon. The indexes were based on a mutually agreed 
expectation of how prices of oil and gas will develop. In addition, unforeseen 
developments such as changes in legislation that have major cost consequences would 
be shared on a fifty-fifty basis. 
• Organization Q would share its profit in energy efficiency improvements that resulted 
from their cooperation with organization P. 
 
The whole contract was about 28 pages long and contained only few safeguards against 
opportunism of the other party. One interviewee stated that one reason for this was, that 
the management of P has only very little experience with outside partnerships of this 
magnitude. Another reason was that already in the beginning, both organizations shared a 
high level of trust in each other and were confident that they would be able to settle any 
disagreements in due course.  
 
Furthermore, the contract only specified a quantitative approach of volumes of different 
products, maximum quantities, specific deliver points, prices and their indexing formulas, 
including taxes and issues of measurement. Some products like hot water can be returned 
into the generating process and therefore have to satisfy specific technical values. These 
values were also included in the contract. The service level agreement was about 9 pages 
long and contained additional information for the co-ordination of the interfirm 
transactional relationship.   
 
Initially, both parties were engaged with this transactional relationship for 10 years. 
Premature cancellation of the contract was possible after 60 months with an extension of 
12 months.  In that case, organization P could reacquire the CHP’s from organization Q 
for a preset transfer price. If organization Q would go bankrupt, organization P had the 
first option to reacquire the CHP’s as well.  
 
Three realms 
20-9-06 18
So, the contract mainly existed of a general description of the transaction and a limited 
amount of information about preventing co-ordination problems at the operational level.  
2.8 Relational realm 
Organization P interacted with a number of other firms, among which other hospitals and 
suppliers of products and services used within the hospital. Its maintenance contractor 
was a firm that was also reviewed as a possible partner in this particular interfirm 
transactional relationship. The maintenance contractor operated a specialized department 
in energy contracts. This department asked organization P whether they could participate 
in the second invitation to gain the contract. Being related to the current maintenance 
contractor this specialized department had a positive reputation. In fact the specialized 
department even got into the second round to compete with the current partner. In the end 
their offer was financially the lesser.  
 
During the first invitation an energy contractor in cooperation with a maintenance 
contractor also issued their first offer. Organization P had no knowledge of the 
maintenance contractor, so it started using its network to find some references about this 
maintenance contractor. They found another hospital that provided a negative reference. 
 
Most incumbent energy contractors had to deal with a negative image of being 
bureaucratic. The transformation towards a market driven sector was a problem for most 
of them as they had little knowledge of customer relationship management. In fact there 
was an institutionalized distrust of former energy contractors. To the exception of this, 
organization Q had managed to create a trust based relationship. The relational aspect 
played a major role between the limited number of persons who were involved during the 
actual contracting phase. In particular, one person at organization Q was very convincing 
with organization P and perhaps it was to his credit that the contract was relatively simple 
and concise. In addition, both organizations took their time to clarify their interests 
openly. “Potential opportunism is always present and cannot be fully excluded” as an 
interviewee said. Therefore, the joint discussions were aimed at discovering each other’s 
interests instead of safeguarding each other’s potentially opportunistic behavior. So 
commitment in the interfirm transactional relationship was sought.  
 
During the due diligence phase of the interfirm transactional relationship some problems 
occurred. These problems were often solved by bargaining about possible solutions. The 
solutions were mostly found in tolerant behavior from one of the parties. In this case both 
parties had their own problems. By discussing the problems with the other party a kind of 
leniency between the parties came into existence. This kind of leniency may be related to 
the trust building process, through relational signaling. For instance by discussing the 
problem openly, the other party is being signaled a problem solving and cooperative 
attitude. By discussing problems both parties experienced that expectations about each 
other were met.  
 
Three realms 
20-9-06 19
2.9 Operational realm 
The overall process of generating utilities was transferred to organization Q as well as the 
technical installations to provide the utilities. Both transfers had unavoidable 
consequences for the operational realm. Some of them even had consequences for the 
relational realm and the contractual realm. The asset specificity in this case is not as high 
as in a situation of complete business process redesign. Although, organization Q is the 
new owner of the installations and the processes, organization P is responsible for first-
in-line maintenance. The results of any first-in-line maintenance activity is reported to 
Organization Q. Basically, this shared responsibility suggests that up to a certain extent 
business process redesign has taken place. 
 
The operators of organization P were used to certain workflows and processes in the 
technical department. The interfirm transactional relationship generated changes in these 
workflows and processes. For instance, operators were not allowed to adjust any 
operational parameters anymore as stated in the contract. During the due diligence period 
organization Q found out that the operators of organization P were highly competent in 
running the utilities and had more tacit knowledge than expected by organization Q. As a 
result organization Q allowed these operators to change operational parameters on the 
condition that changes were reported. So, during the due diligence the amount of trust 
between both parties increased. Expectations of the other party were met, leading to more 
trust between both parties.  
Operators of organization P were not responsible for maintaining the utility installations, 
however they still performed first-in-line maintenance if asked by the maintenance 
contractor. In practice this first-in-line maintenance is performed by operators of 
organization P.  
 
As organization P continued to perform a lot of first-in-line maintenance on the 
installations, few interfaces were needed within the operational realm. Other maintenance 
was planned and executed by organization Q in accordance with organization P. Most 
important was the synchronization of different maintenance planning items (of 
organization Q) and work transfer of executed maintenance by organization P. During the 
first years weekly consultations between members of the both organizations ensured the 
synchronization of work items clear. After some years this consultation became bi-
weekly. As the engineers of organization Q found many maintenance activities more 
difficult than expected and as there were many replacements of maintenance engineers, 
organization Q needed much time to acquire the competences needed.  
 
The low degree of specification in the contract led to flexibility in the operational realm. 
The absence of work instructions, work items and process descriptions kept the interfirm 
relationship very flexible towards unexpected events. However, the absence of structure 
can also have an opposite effect. The engineers of both parties gradually built a joint 
perspective on how to perform activities most efficiently, enhancing the formation of 
accurate expectations about each other. 
 
Three realms 
20-9-06 20
2.10 Events and their dynamic links 
As it was explained in section 2.2 a natural experiment methodology was followed for the 
purpose of tracking cause and effect chains in the three realm constellation of figure 3. 
The events selected were all thought to represent exogenous shocks. Besides, the 
combination of events was selected such that all links could potentially be triggered; 
therefore no link was excluded in advance. The consequences of every event for other 
realms were traced as far as possible, although it certainly cannot be guaranteed that 
some relevant effects were not recorded or that long-term effects were still to materialize 
after the observation period. Besides, there will be a chance of effects being the 
consequence of other causes than the ones recorded or effects being a consequence of 
multiple causes. This is why we can only speak about a natural experiment and why the 
presence of a phenomenon is more important then the absence. In particular, the events 
and consequence observed would tell us that a link did appear, whereas the inability to 
observe a link does not mean that it did not exist. Nevertheless, the events and their 
consequences do give as an opportunity to substantiate our framework. 
 
 
Event 1: An employee of a subcontractor of organization Q fell short in familiarizing 
himself with the equipment. 
Basically, this meant that a contractual requirement for organization Q, i.e. to achieve a 
minimum level of asset specific knowledge, was not met. Although the employee was 
only a member of a subcontractor, the relationship was harmed as well. In the short term, 
the operational relationship was faced with insufficient capacity to keep the equipment 
running and in good condition. An employee of organization P, who was responsible for 
the training of this particular employee, was asked to stay until a new employee could be 
assigned. This event is an example of link A2. A shortcoming in the operational 
relationship also stressed the relational realm and the existence of trust. 
 
Event 2: A subcontractor of organization P failed to install a new cooling system in time. 
Before the contract with organization Q became effective, organization P was agreed to 
have the new cooling system installed first. To sustain the relationship the partners agreed 
to adapt the contract (before signing it) to include the old and new cooling system. This 
contractual failure has reduced trust within organization Q. The cooling system was 
installed by this subcontractor eventually, and organization Q was now responsible for all 
maintenance of the cooling system. This event affected the links A2, B1 and C1, again 
involving trust. 
 
Event 3: The contract between organizations P and Q was signed, regardless of the 
previous events encountered by both organizations.  
Operational activities started with the help of an employee of organization P who 
provided the necessary specific knowledge. The leniency of both parties in the previous 
events provided enhanced trust in further developing this interfirm transactional 
relationship. This event triggered the link B1. 
 
Event 4: The installation of a sophisticated energy supply measurement system was 
postponed.  
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In the contract this system played an essential role in measuring the energy efficiency and 
these measurements were an integral part of the contract. The specific knowledge was not 
acquired in time to pinpoint the exact measuring points within the processes. Both 
organizations had the choice between postponing the whole cooperation or starting the 
operations without a specific means of measuring performance. Both organizations came 
to the agreement to share the financial consequences of using less than accurate 
measurements. Organization P also expressed a loss of trust in the subcontractor of 
organization Q. This event is an example link B2. The consequences of this event on the 
operational level are considered insignificant. 
 
Event 5: A key person left organization Q. 
About six months after the contract was established a highly skilled and informed 
maintenance engineer left, taking with him al tacit knowledge about the equipment and 
the personal trust-based relationship with other employees of organizations P and Q. 
Pressure was put on the management of organization Q to make sure he would be 
replaced by an equally skilled person. A change on the operational level of the 
relationship has caused problems on the relational level of the relationship, i.e. links A1 
and A2 were involved. Finally, organization Q was able to replace this key person, with 
even better skills.  
 
Event 6: Organization Q wanted to overhaul a motor management system. 
In the contract several parts of the motor system are allocated to either Organization P or 
Q. However, to guarantee an optimal overhaul process, the entire motor system has to be 
overhauled. Organization P has to agree with this and share in the overhaul cost. This 
event originates on the operational level and caused issues at the contractual and 
relational level. Again the links A2 and B1 are involved. At the time of this writing, this 
issue is pending. However, both organizations expect to find a solution. 
2.11 Discussion 
Initial motives still play an important role in the transactional relationship. Since both 
partners remained separate organizations with their own dynamic business goals, a future 
misalignment posed a potential threat to the interfirm transactional relationship. Even in 
the beginning, the relationship resulted from a number of important decisions both 
organizations had to make. On the one hand, Organization P accepted the loss of in-house 
technical expertise on power generation and servicing, becoming completely dependent 
on the competence and integrity of organization Q. On the other hand, organization Q 
was prepared to invest heavily in new equipment with a long pay back time. The risk was 
acceptable for organization Q for the sake of a profitable long-term relationship.  
 
From the start of the transactional relationship many process ownership problems 
occurred. Event 2 is an example of problems resulting from unclear or ineffective 
allocation of ownership of technical systems. Mostly, both parties managed to solve the 
issues as they went. Arguably, an important source of the ownership problems was the 
lack of involvement of engineers in the phase of contract design.  
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As organization Q employed other contractors, which were not explicitly involved in the 
original contract, it assumed responsibility for their performance. In particular, event 1 
demonstrates that even though an outside contractor could be blamed solely for bad 
performance, organization Q took the “punishment” on the relational level and 
operational level. Apparently, organization Q took the blame unequivocally for problems 
caused by subcontractors as it improved its trustworthiness as a party in the alliance. 
 
It appeared that every event triggered a cause and effect chain that involved trust in some 
way or another. Even though the events described above were mostly negative, it hasn’t 
led to a decrease in trust. On the contrary, all interviewees agreed that nowadays trust is 
larger than in the beginning of the relationship. Also, the interviewees agreed that no one 
was blamed for not being able to prevent the negative events in the first place, but 
instead, mutual respect and trust were built by solving these issues informally, quickly 
and successfully. So far, this transactional relationship has proven to be quite robust and 
to respond flexible to problems. Of course, the contract was established in the end of the 
year 2001, with many more years to come. However, many problems have been dealt 
with and solved appropriately. The solution was always created in the relational and 
operational realms. It is conjectured that eventually the various forms of trust that were 
encountered after the events were rooted in a strong trust in the initial objectives of the 
transactional relationship. It seems that the initial cooperation is still seen as sound and 
sensible. This generates the mutual trust required for keeping the relationship going on 
solving problems and vouching for each other to signal this commitment. 
 
Issues of reliability and validity 
Being a one-case study the external validity of the results of the study cannot be high. 
However, the set up of the study was such that reliability and internal validity were 
enhanced. Reliability is sought by 
- having the persons interviewed comment on interview transcriptions and seek 
approval; 
- taking interviews in both organizations that comment on both sides of the 
links discerned; 
- reading the written contract and the service level agreements for purposes of 
triangulation; 
- choosing events that are thought exogenous of nature; 
- choosing the collection of events such that all realms could be initiated at least 
once. 
Validity is sought by asking the persons interviewed whether 
- the interpretations of the research team with respect of the nature of the links 
between the three realms per event were accurate, in particular focusing on the 
role of trust; 
- whether confidence in the initial alliance objective was the source of the 
robustness of the alliance when unexpected problems recorded occurred. 
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2.12 Conclusions 
The case study clearly shows that the case could be understood in terms of the three 
realms introduced in this paper as well as the links between the realms. Furthermore, 
almost all theoretical links, except for C2, were initiated at least once during the initial 
two-year life span of the contract. Therefore, the three realms were connected and, as C2 
was not observed, the relational realm took a more central place in the schema than the 
two other realms. This observation raises the question whether it is possible at all to 
observe paths that exclude the relational relationship. In all events the existence of trust 
or trust building processes were involved. In this case trusting each other in trying to 
attain the original goals of the cooperation remains a vital working mechanism behind the 
dynamic links. This corroborates the notion of the relational realm having a central role 
in the relationship. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Dynamic links in the three-realm model adapted to case experience 
 
 
Of course the conclusions with respect to the framework are provisional as they are based 
on one case. However, when describing the case on the basis of the framework it proved 
possible to understand a number of events in terms of the dynamics that resulted from 
these events and in terms of the links between the three realms. The results proved to be 
reliable and valid within the context of the one-case study. 
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Future research could substantiate the framework further. The various forms of trust or of 
trust building working in the various dynamic links could be specified. One might expect 
to find other forms of trust to be embodied in the links A1 and A2 involving the 
operational realm, than are embodied in the links B1 and B2 involving the contractual 
realm. Our case suggests that confidence remaining in the original purpose of the 
cooperation is pivotal in this respect. 
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